| Year | Name of the Court | Case | Work Cited | Assertion in the case |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977 | Michigan Court of Appeals | People v. Nelson, 79 Mich. App. 303, 261 N.W.2d 299 (1977), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 406 Mich. 1020, 281 N.W.2d 134 (1979) | Bienen, Rape II, 3 Womens Rights Law Reporter 90, 95 (1977). | The purpose is to greatly reduce any possibility that alleged consent of a victim is, in trial, a matter of defense. In fact, in one law reporter, the new statute is described as “the pro-victim Michigan statute”. People v. Nelson, 261 N.W.2d 299, 307 n.30 (Mich. 1977), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 281 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. 1979) (citing Bienen, Rape II, 3 Womens Rights Law Reporter 90, 95 (1977)). |
| 1978 | New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division | State v. Hill, 166 N.J. Super. 224, 399 A.2d 667 (Law. Div. 1978), rev'd, 170 N.J. Super. 485, 406 A.2d 1334 (App. Div. 1979) | Bienen, Rape I, 3 Women's Rts. L.Rptr. No. 2, 45, at 47 (1976) | “…leads to the inescapable conclusion that the means chosen to provide this protection is a blanket assumption that all women confined to institutions for the feeble-minded or mentally ill are incapable of consenting to sexual relations. State v. Hill, 399 A.2d 667, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1978), rev'd, 406 A.2d 1334 (App. Div. 1979) (citing Bienen, “Rape I,” 3 Women's Rts. L.Rptr. No. 2, 45, at 47 (1976)). |
| 1980 | Washington Supreme Court | State v. Camara, 113 Wash. 2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989), overruled by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 180–81 | While some have suggested that rape law reform has eliminated consent as an issue in rape prosecutions, State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483, 486 n3 (Wash. 1989), overruled by State v. W.R., Jr., 336 P.3d 1134 (Wash. 2014) (citing Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 180–81)). |
| 1981 | Wisconsin Supreme Court | State v. Kummer, 100 Wis. 2d 220, 301 N.W.2d 240 (1981) | Bienen, Rape II, 3 Women's Rights Law Reporter, 90 (1977) | For a discussion of state rape or sexual assault laws, see ALI, 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries sec. 213.1, Comment (1980). State v. Kummer, 301 N.W.2d 240, 246 n.9 (Wis. 1981) (citing Bienen, Rape II, 3 Women's Rights Law Reporter, 90 (1977)). |
| 1984 | Arizona Supreme Court | Murphy v. Superior Ct. In & For Maricopa Cty., 142 Ariz. 273, 689 P.2d 532 (1984) | Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 Cal.W.L.Rev. 235 (1983). | The “Wigmore rule” appears to be founded, not in fact, but in old attitudes critical of the credibility of a rape prosecutrix' testimony which we held in State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976), to be “fostered by the fallacy that the crime of rape is characterized by a high incidence of unwarranted accusations and prosecutions which rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim.” Id. at 27, 545 P.2d at 951; Murphy v. Superior Ct. In & For Maricopa Cty., 689 P.2d 532, 535 (Ariz. 1984) (citing Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 Cal.W.L.Rev. 235 (1983)). |
| 1987 | Washington Supreme Court | State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987) | Hubert S. Feild & Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law 7 (1980). | There are, however, many circumstances in which a judge or jury may need assistance in understanding the evidence put before them, where the subject matter is strange, emotional, and overladen with historical assumptions and possibly misapprehensions. A jury punishes, excuses, exonerates, ignores, or selects from a hodgepodge of social and psychological information received in the courtroom.... The theory of our system is that jurors can separate out the fact… State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 20, 23 (Wash. 1987) (citing H. Feild & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape 7 (1980)). |
| 1988 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 377, 548 A.2d 939, 1018 (1988) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Specifically, defendant submitted to this Court a portion of the preliminary report of the Public Defender's study on the New Jersey death penalty statute entitled State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 1018, 953 (N.J. 1988) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1988 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 377, 548 A.2d 939, 1018 (1988) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Public Defender has compiled an instructive study that indicates that unguided prosecutorial discretion leads to or has contributed to disparity and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 1018 (N.J. 1988) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1988 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | This study, entitled “The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: Homicide Cases from 1982–1986,” by Leigh Bienen, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, and Neil Alan Wiener, Senior Research Associate at the Sellin Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsylvania (hereinafter Study or Report), was acknowledged by the Court in State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 256, 548 A.2d 939. State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 853 (N.J. 1988) (citing Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, Rutgers L.Rev. (1988)). |
| 1988 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Still, it seems that defendant shares characteristic features of mental disturbance with many other death-sentenced in New Jersey. State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022, 1049 (N.J. 1988) (citing Leigh B. Bienan, et al., “The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,” 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1989 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Matulewicz, 115 N.J. 191, 557 A.2d 1001 (1989) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | “Not surprisingly, arbitrary results are indeed emerging. In several capital-murder appeals, the Public Defender has brought to our attention statistical evidence gathered in analyzing the administration of the capital murder-death penalty statute. State v. Matulewicz, 557 A.2d 1001, 1010 (N.J. 1989) (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1989 | New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division | State v. Martin, 235 N.J. Super. 47, 561 A.2d 631 (App. Div. 1989) | Bienen, “Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation,” 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 176 (1980). | We need not detail here the evidence that males in a custodial setting are equally vulnerable, or the criticism leveled at the Commission and at the Model Penal Code respecting an asserted sexist bias. State v. Martin, 561 A.2d 631, 635 n.5 (N.J. App. Div. 1989) (citing Bienen, “Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation,” 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 176 (1980)). |
| 1990 | Puerto Rico, El Tribunal Supremo | Elba A.B.M. v. U.P.R., 125 P.R. Dec. 294 (1990) | Hubert S. Feild & Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law (1980). | This situation worsens when the woman is summoned to appear--as is usually the case--before a court that has not yet rid itself of that kind of attitude. Elba A.B.M. v. U.P.R., 125 P.R. Dec. 294, 323 (1990) (citing HHubert S. Feild & Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law (1980)). |
| 1990 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | In the relatively brief history of our current death-penalty law there have been capital prosecutions of defendants on both sides of a contract killing. State v. Di Frisco, 571 A.2d 914, 940 (1990) (citing Leigh B. Bienan, et al., “The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,” 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1990 | Oregon Supreme Court | State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 786 P.2d 161 (1990) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Although defendant cites no authority for the proposition that plea bargaining, standing alone, is a privilege, immunity, or benefit of state or federal constitutional significance, we assume that standardless or irrational plea bargaining or a refusal to plea bargain for an improper purpose would be a governmental act within Article I, section 20. State v. Farrar, 86 P.2d 161, 168 (Or. 1990) (citing Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27(1988)). |
| 1990 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | “In the opinion of the authors, this statistical evidence is sufficiently compelling to shift the burden to the State to come forward with evidence that the system of selecting cases for capital prosecution does not operate in a manner which offends constitutional principles. State v. Long, 575 A.2d 435, 471 (N.J. 1990) (citing Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Allison & Mills, “The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,” 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27, (1988)). |
| 1991 | Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals | Adams v. Peterson, 939 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1991), opinion withdrawn, 959 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1992), and opinion superseded on reh'g, 968 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1992) | Hubert S. Feild & Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law 47 (1980) | American jurors continue to be more likely to believe that a black man accused of rape is guilty than to presume his innocence. Adams v. Peterson, 939 F.2d 1369, 1389 (9th Cir. 1991), opinion withdrawn, 959 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1992), and opinion superseded on reh'g, 968 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing H. Field & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape 47 (1980)). |
| 1991 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 594 A.2d 172 (1991) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Perhaps the majority of decisionmakers in the system, including penalty-phase jurors, believe that this factor, if it exists, ought to be the factual basis for the imposition of a death sentence.” State v. Biegenwald, 594 A.2d 172, 224 (N.J. 1991) (citing Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | “Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27, 163 n. 671 (1988) (noting that 81.5% of 703 homicide cases in New Jersey between 1982 and 1986 were handled by the State Public Defender's office or court appointed counsel).” State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1144 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | (describing the impact that the allegation of an aggravating factor has throughout proceedings). State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1145 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | Bienen, supra, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. at 259–61 & table 51 (reporting that in sixty-nine New Jersey cases proceeding to penalty trials, mitigating factor c(5)(a), mental or emotional disturbance, was alleged in 59.4% and mitigating factor c(5)(d), impairment of defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, in 68.1% of those trials) State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1146 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | The re-enactment of the death penalty cost Texas $183.2 million. Leigh Bienen, No Savings in Lives or Money with Death Penalty, New York Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at 24 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1145 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981) | Those three elements of rape—carnal knowledge, forcibly, and against her will—remained the essential elements of the crime until 1979. State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1270 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981) | (noting that common-law principles excluded spouses from prosecution in New Jersey as in most other jurisdictions). State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981) | The new statutory provisions covering rape were formulated by a coalition of feminist groups assisted by the National Organization of Women (NOW) National Task Force on Rape. State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1274 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape II, 3 Womens Rights Law Reporter 90 (1977). | The NOW bill had been modeled after the 1976 Philadelphia Center for Rape Concern Model Sex Offense Statute. State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape II, 3 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 90 (1977)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170 (1981) | The Model Sex Offense Statute in turn had been based on selected provisions of the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, Mich.Stat.Ann. § 28.788(4)(b) (Callaghan 1990), [M.C.L.A. § 750.520d] and on the reform statutes in New Mexico, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State in Int. of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170 (1981) | The reform statute defines sexual assault as penetration accomplished by the use of “physical force” or “coercion,” but it does not define either “physical force” or “coercion” or enumerate examples of evidence that would establish those elements. Some reformers had argued that defining “physical force” too specifically in the sexual offense statute might have the effect of limiting force to the enumerated examples. State in Int. of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1992) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 1992 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Jackson, 128 N.J. 136, 607 A.2d 974 (1992) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | The statistical evidence indicates that attitudes vary widely throughout the state on whether certain kinds of homicides justify capital punishment. State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974, 983 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, Rutgers L.Rev. (1988)). |
| 1995 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 662 A.2d 333 (1995) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | One statistical study notes an alarming prevalence of mental illness among New Jersey's capital defendants. State v. Harris, 662 A.2d 333, 390 (N.J. 1995) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, et al. The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988)). |
| 1998 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Zeidell, 154 N.J. 417, 713 A.2d 401 (1998) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170 (1981) | The Philadelphia Center for Rape Concern had, in turn, modeled its statute primarily on selected provisions of the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.788(4)(b) (Callaghan 1990), and on reform statutes in New Mexico, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. M.T.S., supra, 129 N.J. at 440, 609 A.2d 1266. State v. Zeidell, 713 A.2d 401, 424 (N.J. 1998) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, (1981)). |
| 1999 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 724 A.2d 129 (1999) | Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996) | “These statutes were passed because of the then widely-held perception that the Supreme Court would not uphold state capital punishment legislation that lacked such provisions.” State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 136 (N.J. 1999) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996)). |
| 1999 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 724 A.2d 129 (1999) | Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996) | “It is perhaps significant that Florida and North Carolina have relatively large death-row populations compared to other states“ State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 138 (N.J. 1999) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996)). |
| 1999 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 724 A.2d 129 (1999) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27, 49 (1988) | “These antebellum formal racial distinctions in the law were not limited to the South. In the colonial era, New Jersey laws also facially discriminated against slaves and free blacks” State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 207 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996)). |
| 1999 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 724 A.2d 129 (1999) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27, 49 (1988) | “New Jersey's experience with capital punishment is rife with evidence of racial discrimination. It parallels the national experience.“ State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 208 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996)). |
| 2000 | Supreme Court | United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000) | Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law 95 (1980)). | [A]n individual who commits rape has only about 4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty of any offense.’ ” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 633-34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) quoting S.Rep. No. 101–545, at 33, n. 30 (quoting H. Feild & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law 95 (1980))). |
| 2000 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 388, 757 A.2d 266 (2000) | Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) | (tracking higher risk of capital prosecution in particular group of pro-death penalty counties, especially for African-American defendants with Caucasian victims) State v. Feaster, 757 A.2d 266, 303 (N.J. 2000) (Long, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, Rutgers L.Rev. (1988)). |
| 2000 | Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court | Com. v. Smith, 431 Mass. 417, 728 N.E.2d 272 (2000) | Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1536 (1998) | And with good reason, because the concern for genetic purity appears to be the least probable explanation and justification for the incest prohibition. See, e.g., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 230.2 comment 2(b), at 402–405 (1980). Com. v. Smith, 728 N.E.2d 272, 277 n.5 (Mass. 2000) (citing Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1501, 1531, 1537 (1998)). |
| 2001 | New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division | State v. Maxwell, 361 N.J. Super. 502, 825 A.2d 1224 (Law. Div. 2001), aff'd in part, 361 N.J. Super. 401, 825 A.2d 1162 (App. Div. 2003) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 180–81 | The Court stated that “the Model Sex Offense Statute in turn had been based on selected provisions of the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, Mich. Stat. Ann. Section 28.788(4)(b) (Callaghan 1990.), (M.C.L.A. Section 750.520d) and on reform statutes in New Mexico, Minnesota and Wisconsin. State v. Maxwell, 825 A.2d 1224, 1229 (N.J. Law. Div. 2001), aff'd in part, 825 A.2d 1162, (N.J. App. Div. 2003) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 207 (1981)). |
| 2002 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Papasavvas, 170 N.J. 462, 790 A.2d 798 (2002) | Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130 (1996). | see Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (With Lessons From New Jersey), 64 Alb. L.Rev. 1161, 1198 (2001), under the existing paradigm I do not find defendant's death sentence to be disproportionate based on either the undisputed facts or a combination of the undisputed and disputed facts. I respectfully disagree with the Court's holding and therefore dissent. State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 830 (N.J. 2002) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130 (1996)). |
| 2007 | West Virginia, Supreme Court of Appeals | State v. Ray, 221 W. Va. 364, 655 S.E.2d 110 (2007) | Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1562–67 (1998) | defining most serious sex offense in terms of requiring that victim is at least 13 but less than 16 and requiring perpetrator to be member of same household, or related to victim by blood or affinity to the fourth degree, holding position of authority over victim, or teacher or administrator); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 609.342 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C–14–2 (West 2004); see Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1562–67 (1998). The New Jersey and Michigan statutes modernized the approach taken to incest by recognizing that the [r]elationship of the parties, or the existence of a marriage, is irrelevant to the definition of the offense if the child is under thirteen years old. For acts with children under age thirteen, there is no distinction in penalty or in the categorization of the harm, between sexual acts between father and daughter, for example, and sexual acts with an acquaintance or a stranger. State v. Ray, 655 S.E.2d 110, 118 (W. Va. 2007) (citing Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1562–67 (1998)). |
| 2007 | West Virginia, Supreme Court of Appeals | State v. Ray, 221 W. Va. 364, 655 S.E.2d 110 (2007) | Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1562–67 (1998) | The need to replace traditional incest statutes with an expanded definition of sexual abuse was compelled by the circumstances being reported to social service agencies, hospitals, and therapists. State v. Ray, 655 S.E.2d 110, 119 (W. Va. 2007) (citing Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1562–67 (1998)). |
| 2009 | Puerto Rico Court of Appeals | Moux Figueroa v. Puerto Rico Telepone Co. (P.R. Cir. Mar. 17, 2009) | H. Feild & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law | Todo lo anterior se agrava cuando la mujer tiene, como normalmente ocurre, que comparecer ante los tribunales, los cuales aun no han sido depurados del todo de ese tipo de actitud. Moux Figueroa v. Puerto Rico Telepone Co. (P.R. Cir. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing H.S. Feild y L.B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in Psychology and Law, Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company, 1980; A.M. Scacco, Male Rape, Nueva York, A.M.S. Press, Inc., 1982)). |
| 2013 | New Jersey Supreme Court | State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 64 A.3d 558 (2013) | Bienen, Rape II, 3 Womens Rights Law Reporter 90, 92 (1977). | Although the aggravated-sexual-assault section of the Center's proposed statute resembles the final product of the Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2(a)(3), see L. 1978, c. 95, § 2C:14–2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979, the Center's proposal did not include the precise statutory provisions at issue in this case. State v. Rangel, 64 A.3d 558, 566 (N.J. 2013) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape II, 3 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 90, 92 (1977)). |
| 2014 | Nevada Supreme Court | Douglas v. State, 130 Nev. 285, 327 P.3d 492 (2014) | Defining Incest, 92 NWU L Rev 1501, 1536 (1998) | And adopting the rule in DeGroat and Jarvis would thwart the evident purpose of the prohibition against incest—protecting families and the welfare of children, and preventing genetic mutations. Douglas v. State, 327 P.3d 492, 497 (Nev. 2014) (citing Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1501, 1536 (1998)). |
| 2019 | New Mexico Supreme Court | Fry v. Lopez, 2019-NMSC-013, 447 P.3d 1086 | See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases By State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice?”, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130 (1996) | For these reasons, the secondary literature indicates that death sentences are overturned as comparatively disproportionate only very rarely. (surveying the states that perform comparative proportionality review and noting only a limited number of instances where death sentences were overturned as comparatively disproportionate). It is, ironically, the Majority's position in this case that is the outlier. Fry v. Lopez, 447 P.3d 1086, 1138 (N.M. 2019) (citing See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases By State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice?”, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130 (1996)). |
| 2020 | Oregon Supreme Court | State v. Haltom, 366 Or. 791, 472 P.3d 246 (2020) | Bienen, Rape III—National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 170, 180–81 | But, in 1983, those ideas had only started to gain traction among legal theorists and were still a subject of debate. State v. Haltom, 472 P.3d 246, 258 (Or. 2020) (citing Leigh Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Women's Rts L Rep 170, 180-84 (1980)). |
